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Abstract - The literature on Open Source phenomenon has revealed the crucial role played by both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. However an analysis attempting to formally explore this interplay is 
still missing. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by introducing intrinsic motivations in standard 
principal-agent model, focusing on the case of Ope n  S o u r c e  S o f t w a r e  ( O SS). We show that, if 
developers’ intrinsic motivation is sufficiently high, paying developers to work on OSS projects allows 
the firm to induce a desired level of workers’ effort at a lower cost compared to the standard case of 
monetary incentives and sanctions coupled with costly monitoring. 
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The Open Source Software (OSS) phenomenon has, by now, been explored from
many angles (for surveys, see Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006 and Rossi, 2006).
The questions that have so far attracted the bulk of the attention have to do
with the (at ﬁrst) puzzling fact that individuals were willing to contribute to
a good that was made available for free without any direct monetary compen-
sation and that the combination of this ‘anarchic’ array of contributions was a
set of software products of remarkable quality. The empirical literature on the
matter has revealed that both intrinsic and extrinsic developers’ motivations
play a role and that it is di cult to extract a case for the absolute prevalence
of either sort of motivation. To our knowledge, however, no formal analysis of
the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations has been provided.
In this paper, we provide a formalization of the e ects of the interaction be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on a developer’s choice of development
e ort in the context of an OSS ﬁrm, namely a ﬁrm hiring developers to work
on OSS projects. In order to more clearly highlight the relevant e ects, we base
our analysis on a standard adverse selection model such as the one presented in
La ont and Martimort (2002) but we specify the agent’s (developer’s) decision
problem so as to take into account the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations.
The formalization we provide allows to shed light on three interrelated ques-
tions. What is the role of intrinsic motivation within the ﬁrm? Besides tech-
nical/market reasons, is there some reason for purely self-interested ﬁrms for
choosing the OSS form of production for some of their activities (i.e. hiring de-
velopers to work on OSS)? When are “OSS contracts” more likely to be observed?
The analysis suggests that it is precisely developers’ intrinsic motivation that
may provide a reason di erent from technical and market ones why ﬁrms may
ﬁnd it in their interest to adopt a OSS production model. To hire developers to
work on OSS projects may be rational for a purely self-interested ﬁrm because
it allows to reduce the cost of providing monetary incentives when developers’
behavior is inﬂuenced by intrinsic motivation. Moreover, the model shows that
paying developers to work on OSS projects allows the ﬁrm to induce a desired
level of e ort on the part of the agent at a cost that might be lower than that
incurred by recurring to the use of monitoring and costly sanctions.
1The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the existing literature on
the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of OSS developers and
analyzes some distinctive aspects of developers’ intrinsic motivation within the
OSS ﬁrm. Section 3 introduces the principal-agent model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Motivation and OSS De-
velopment
2.1 Previous literature
The empirical evidence so far available on the issue of OSS developers’ motiva-
tion has revealed a composite landscape in which both intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations play a role (Gosh et al., 2002; Hars and Ou, 2001; Hertel et al.
2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2001). Extrinsic motivations relate to the immedi-
ate or delayed beneﬁts accruing to the individual in a mediated form, generally
through monetary compensation. Within this category are included the beneﬁts
in terms of increased reputation within and outside of the OSS community that
are obtainable through OSS contributions (see, for instance, Lerner and Tirole,
2002), the satisfaction of user needs through OSS programming (von Hippel,
2002) and the beneﬁts in terms of learning and skill acquisition made possible
by the participation to OSS projects. With the expression intrinsic motivations,
by contrast, reference is made to the beneﬁts that accrue the individual from
performing an activity because that activity is valued per se, as it is the case,
for instance for the play-value and homo-ludens payo s that derive from the
performance of a fun activity. Lindenberg (2001) has proposed a further dis-
tinction between enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation, which is closer to the
previous deﬁnition, and obligation/community-based intrinsic motivation that
refers to the intrinsic beneﬁts that may be associated to adherence to social or
community norms and has been variously named gift-giving, reciprocal altruism
or generalized reciprocity (on intrinsic motivation see also Bitzer et al., 2006).
The ‘user needs’ sort of extrinsic motivation has been explored particularly
by Eric von Hippel and his colleagues at MIT. The main insight o ered by this
set of papers is that the free revealing of innovations developed in the ﬁrst place
for a personal need might turn out to be in the interest of a rational individual
2because the beneﬁt from revelation might be large enough to outweigh the costs
of di usion (kept low by the decreasing costs of digital communication) and the
opportunity costs of release in the public domain (that may be low at least for
some of the heterogeneous participants to OSS communities).
Another sort of extrinsic motivation that has fared prominently in the liter-
ature is the pursuit of reputation. The reputation-maximizing story has been
proposed particularly by Lerner and Tirole (2002) who interpret the e ort spent
in contributing to OSS projects as a signal to both the community of peers and
to the labor market. By contributing to OSS projects developers enjoy an imme-
diate beneﬁt in terms of increased reputation among their peers and a delayed
beneﬁts in the form of better job o ers relative to non-OSS developers. Accord-
ing to Lerner and Tirole, the OSS world constitutes an environment particularly
suitable for the reputation mechanism to display its e ects for a variety of rea-
sons1.
As for intrinsic motivations, emphasis has been placed on the so-called ‘gift-
giving culture’. The expression refers to the fact that OSS developers may
share the adherence to community social norms that attribute a positive value
to the act of giving a ‘gift’ to the community in the form of software source code
or related documentation. Of course, the prevalence of this sort of community
norm makes sense, in particular, in the realm of intangibles for which the non-
rivalry property holds (Kollock, 1999).
Gift-giving might be interpreted in two di erent ways. The ﬁrst interpretation
looks at the gift primarily as a means to acquire status within one’s commu-
nity. The larger the gift, the greater the status acquired within the community.
Along these lines, Eric Raymond, one of the most active ethnographers of the
OSS community, depicts the OSS culture as a gift culture in which economic
scarcity is not an issue and social status is determined "not by what you con-
trol but by what you give away" (Raymond, 1998). A similar perspective is
adopted by Zeitlyn (2003), who stresses that gift-giving allows the accumula-
1Costs are lowered by (a) the ‘alumni e ect’ due to the fact that OSS programs are gen-
erally used at universities; (b) the private beneﬁt of solving a programming problem and (c)
the enjoyment of programming. Beneﬁts include the fact that (a) openness allows a better
performance measurement and increases the visibility of one’s own contribution to the rele-
vant audience; (b) each programmer is fully responsible for her contribution; and (c) the labor
market is more ﬂuid.
3tion of ‘symbolic capital’ in Bourdieu’s terms, and by Bergquist and Ljungberg
(2001) who explore in greater detail the way in which the gift economy organizes
relationships within OSS communities. This interpretation of gift-giving is thus
not very di erent from the reputation-based explanation for contribution. Yet,
it links the acquisition of status and reputation to adherence to a set of shared
social norms within the OSS community that include a need for reciprocation
that may be key in explaining why contributions may be made even if the cost-
beneﬁt balance is more ambiguous by conventional measures.
The second interpretation of gift-giving in OSS communities places the em-
phasis exactly on this set of social norms and explains gifts not as means of
status acquisition, but rather as means to obtain ‘behavioral conﬁrmation’, i.e.
"the feeling of doing or having done ‘the right thing’ in the eyes of relevant
others" (Lindenberg, 2001, p.327). According to this perspective, gift-giving
amounts to a form of reciprocal altruism backed by the perception that one’s
own altruistic behavior is positively valued by the community or to a form of
generalized reciprocity according to which gifts may be given on the basis of the
expectation that a balance might occur within the group as a whole, given that
the whole group shares a similar set of social norms. This aspect of individual
motivation is also often referred to as obligation-based intrinsic motivation, be-
cause it entails the feeling of an obligation to adopt behavior consistent with
community norms, i.e. to publish code. What it is important to note is that
the driver of individual motivation is not the pursuit of an external reward (in
any form, including status), but rather the perception of the need to act appro-
priately according to the metric set by the community – a type of behavior that
Weber has deﬁned ‘value-rational’.
The relevance of motives broadly consistent with this deﬁnition of the gift-giving
culture ﬁnds some support in the empirical literature. Anecdotal evidence con-
ﬁrms that a coherent set of norms, values and shared beliefs informs interactions
in the OSS community, although the extent to which the norms and values of
the community are internalized di ers across participants, with those who sub-
scribe to the views of the Free Software Foundation being at the extreme of the
spectrum of ideological commitment. More formal empirical analyses have also
substantiated the relevance of the sense of identiﬁcation with the community
as a powerful driver of individual participation to OSS projects. This is true
for all the empirical analyses of motivation of which we are aware (Gosh et al.,
42002; Hars and Ou, 2001; Hertel et al. 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2001). In
Lakhani and Wolf the components of obligation and community based motiva-
tion are highly ranked by participants. Similar results appear in the FLOSS
survey (Gosh et al., 2002). Hertel et al. (2003) study contributions to the
Linux kernel, and ﬁnd that identiﬁcation with the Linux community has the
strongest inﬂuence on participants’ engagement, together with the more prag-
matic motive of improving own software and with tolerance of time investments.
2.2 Intrinsic motivation within the OSS ﬁrm
Most of the economic research conducted in the OSS ﬁeld focuses on a range of
issues concerning independent developers, i.e. developers acting outside of any
employment relationship. However, both small ﬁrms’ and corporate involvement
in OSS is signiﬁcant and on the rise, so that the number of developers working
on OSS projects in the context of employment relationships is steadily increas-
ing. At present, at least one third of OSS developers is paid by a commercial
ﬁrm to make contributions to OSS projects that better address the ﬁrms’ needs
(CED, 2007).
Moreover, the empirical evidence available to date (Hars et al. 2002; Lakhani
et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2006) shows that there seems to be no or very
scarce crowding out of intrinsic motivation in OSS, i.e. the intrinsic motiva-
tion of developers is not undermined if they are paid to work on OSS projects
through completion-contingent rewards or performance-contingent rewards. In
other words, developers working for OSS ﬁrms, i.e. within ﬁrms hiring devel-
opers to work on OSS projects, tend to be motivated by both intrinsic and
extrinsic drivers. This is puzzling in light of both the psychological literature,
which shows that certain types of incentive have a detrimental e ect on agents’
motivation, and in light of the economic literature on intrinsic motivation, that
has highlighted the possibility of crowding out in similar but more general con-
texts.
Both of these empirical observations – the increasing involvement of commercial
ﬁrms in OSS projects and the evidence on the absence of crowding-out – moti-
vate the focus of this paper on the issue of motivations within OSS ﬁrms and
particularly on the interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. To un-
derstand the latter it is important to understand the determinants of intrinsic
5motivation within the ﬁrm. We assume that intrinsic motivation corresponds to
the acquisition of ‘Self-Esteem’ through the adoption of behavior congruent with
community social norms. In so doing, we focus on obligation-based intrinsic mo-
tivation, as deﬁned in the previous paragraph. In order to acquire Self-Esteem,
the agent must exercise an e ort that: (a) beneﬁts the community (because
it is released under an OSS license); and (b) exceeds the amount of e ort that
is considered ‘fair’ for a given level of monetary compensation from the principal.
As for (a), working for a principal that allows some or all of the software de-
veloped under the employment contract to be distributed under OSS licenses
means exercising an e ort that is congruent with the community social norms
of ‘generalized reciprocity’ (Kollock, 1999) and thus allows the developer to
acquire Self-Esteem. Moreover, it is reasonable to posit that the acquisition
of Self-Esteem depends not only on reciprocal behavior that directly beneﬁts
the community but also on reciprocal behavior towards the principal, which
indirectly beneﬁts the community given that the latter contributes to the com-
munity by releasing the software developed for her ﬁrm under OSS licenses. This
implies that reciprocity-oriented developers will tend to reciprocate benevolent
behavior by the principal.
As for (b), the amount of e ort that is exactly compensated by the princi-
pal through a payment that reﬂects the agent’s productivity cannot generate
Self-Esteem for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the fraction of the e ort
that is exactly compensated by the principal is perceived as serving the spe-
ciﬁc needs of the ﬁrm (not necessarily congruent with community social norms)
and/or the corresponding compensation is perceived as ‘controlling’ in the sense
speciﬁed by Deci et al. (1999), i.e. shifting the locus of control outside the de-
veloper and therefore likely to undermine intrinsic motivation (see also Bénabou
and Tirole, 2003)2. The second is that, as is well-known in the psychological
literature, in order to be a means of ‘behavioral conﬁrmation’, adherence to
social norms should be costly (Lindenberg, 2001). Acting consistently with the
norms of the OSS community can only provide Self-Esteem if the act cannot
be performed at zero cost, so that the fraction of the e ort whose disutility is
2Deci et al. (1999) and Staw et al. (1980) underline that the very form in which a
reward is presented may a ect intrinsic motivation, distinguishing between rewards that are
purely informational and do not tend to undermine intrinsic motivation and rewards such as
completion-contingent or engagement-contingent rewards that – perceived as controlling by
workers – do tend to undermine intrinsic motivation.
6exactly compensated in monetary terms may not serve the purpose of increasing
Self-Esteem.
The above observations imply that an individual’s Self-Esteem positively de-
pends on the amount of development e ort she exercises beyond the level of
e ort she considers ‘fair’ for a given amount of remuneration, and negatively
depends on the amount of remuneration that exceeds her reservation price for a
given e ort level, i.e. the minimum amount that would induce the agent to o er
that level of e ort. In other words, we assume that, as the amount of remuner-
ation in excess of the reservation price of e ort increases, the individual su ers
a loss of Self-Esteem if she refrains from making an adequate e ort or if her
remuneration is too high as compared to the e ort exercised. This assumption
is at the heart of the formalization we propose, to which we now turn.
3 The interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation: a formalization
In this section, we introduce a standard adverse selection model (La ont and
Martimort, 2002) where, however, the principal/ﬁrm is assumed to be purely
self-interested, while the agent/developer is motivated both by a proﬁt mech-
anism driven by extrinsic motivation and by a ‘moral mechanism’ driven by
(obligation-based) intrinsic motivation following from the fact that she attaches
a positive value to the social norms of gift-giving that are often said to charac-
terize OSS communities.
3.1 The developer’s decision problem
Let the individual’s utility depend on the total amount of goods she may con-
sume (X) and on Self-Esteem (SE). The endogenous variable Self-Esteem is
meant to capture the fact that the individual attaches a positive value to her
own reciprocal or gift-giving attitude, i.e. to behavior coherent with the social
cultural habits of gift-giving prevailing in the OSS community3. This implies
that the individual’s Self-Esteem (and therefore her utility) may decrease as
3In other words, the variable Self-Esteem is meant to capture the individual propensity to
adopt “value rational” behavior in Weberian terms.
7a consequence of behavior inconsistent with social norms4. Assume that the
price of X is 1. The agent’s problem is to choose X and SE to maximize utility,
subject to a budget constraint that includes the expenditure to conserve Self-
Esteem (opportunity cost).




s.t.X + C(SE)=M (2)
where







> 0if SE   SE 
Ue < 0if SE > SE 
Equation [2] indicates the budget constraint and states that the expenditure on
X and on production of Self-Esteem C(SE) indeed the net opportunity cost,
must equal the monetary amount (M) that indicates the remuneration that
exceeds the reservation price of e ort since, as explained above, it is only this
fraction of the remuneration that may produce-induce Self-Esteem. The func-
tion f(e) indicates the amount of Self-Esteem the agent obtains for e ort e.
The e ort e produces a double e ect: it increases disutility by unpleasantness
of working but also produces a larger utility by increasing Self-Esteem, up to
SE . Note that the assumptions on Ue are also meant to capture the fact that,
above a subjectively given amount SE  Self-Esteem becomes a bad (excess of
a good) since it induces a feeling of subjection and exploitation, meaning that
the individual feels she is giving too much in exchange for too limited beneﬁts.
Finally the budget constraint is not linear since the shape of f(e) depends on
social and cultural habits.
The optimal solution implies that:
4A general model is in Basili and Franzini 2007.
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that is the optimal solution for the Agent implies that her Marginal Rate of Sub-
stitution between Self-Esteem and consumption of conventional goods X equals
the ‘Technical Rate of Transformation’ between Self-Esteem and consumption
of conventional goods. It is worth to note that assuming a given M, consump-
tion of conventional goods can only increase by loosing Self-Esteem.
3.2 The Principal’s decision problem
The Principal is assumed to be purely self-interested, as in standard Principal-
Agent models. The problem of the Principal is that of maximising proﬁt, that
is the di erence between the value of production and the associated costs. The
information asymmetry concerns the productivity of the Agent (the software
developer) that could be high or low (E cient or Ine cient Agent), giving rise
to low or high marginal costs, respectively.
Let  H be the constant marginal cost of the e cient Agent and  L the constant
marginal cost of the ine cient Agent. Since the Principal cannot observe  , he
cannot equalise the marginal value of each Agent’s production to its marginal
cost. Indeed, if he were to o er a contract calling for di erent compensation
levels on the basis of the quantity produced and equal to the respective marginal
beneﬁt, the e cient Agent could simulate being ine cient (producing less) with
a view to pocketing the information rent. The latter is equal to the di erence
9between the two marginal costs at the low production level or   qL.
Given information asymmetry, the Principal has thus to establish compensa-
tion levels by disregarding the equality between marginal beneﬁt and marginal
cost, or he has to deﬁne incentive and punishment mechanisms. In both cases
he has to bear an additional cost with respect to the ﬁrst best solution and,
consequently, he will choose the less costly solution. Following La ont and
Martimort, let:
qH,qL the level of production obtained by the e cient and ine cient Agents,
respectively;
S(qH),S(qL) the value of production obtained with the e cient and ine cient
Agents, respectively;
UH,U L the monetary transfer in excess of the compensation of the cost of
production to the e cient and ine cient Agents, respectively;
v,(1   v) the probability to come across an e cient or ine cient Agent, re-
spectively.
Assume further that Ui – the monetary transfer in excess of the cost of produc-
tion – coincides with Mi as deﬁned in section 3.1, i.e. the amount of remunera-
tion that exceeds the agent’s reservation price of e ort. In other words, assume
that the reservation price of each agent’s e ort in producing q is equal to her
cost of producing q, iqi.
The Principal’s maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
{UL,qL,UH,qH}
v [s(qH)    HqH   (1   f(eH))UH]+(1 v)[s(qL)    LqL   (1   f(eL))UL]
(4)
10s.t.
UH   UL +  qL (5)
UL   UH     qH (6)
UH > 0 (7)
UL   0 (8)
Inequalities (5) and (6) represent the incentive constraints for the high and low
productivity Agent, respectively, and inequalities (7) and (8) are participation
constraints. As in similar Principal-Agent problems of this sort we can simplify
the problem by noting that (7) is redundant because it is trivially satisﬁed if
(5) and (8) hold and that (6) is irrelevant because the ine cient agent does not
have incentives to claim that he is e cient. We further note that (5) and (7)
must be binding. This leaves us with:
UL =0 (9)
UH =  qL (10)
Substituting the new constraints into the maximization problem we have:
max
{q,,qH}
v [s(qH)    HqH   (1   f(eH))  qL] + (1   v)[s(qL)    LqL] (11)
The choice to hire developers to work on OSS projects by the principal inﬂu-
ences the value assumed by the function f(ei). An OSS development contract
guarantees that 0 <f (ei)   1 (where the ﬁrst inequality is strict), while a
non-OSS development contract implies that f(ei)=0since working for a ﬁrm
that does not contribute to the OSS community does not allow the developer
to acquire Self-Esteem through on-the-job development e ort. By choosing to
release her products under OSS licenses, the ﬁrm is able to “activate” devel-
opers’ intrinsic motivation: in this case to exert development e ort may allow
developers to acquire Self-Esteem, given that this choice allows them to abide
11by the OSS community social norms. This will not hold if the ﬁrm chooses a
non-OSS business model and employment contract.
If 0 <f (ei)   1, in turn, a fraction f(ei)Ui of the monetary transfer in ex-
cess of the cost of production that the principal gives to the agent will translate
into increased e ort. This is because a fraction of the monetary transfer in ex-
cess of the reservation price of e ort (Mi,that in our formulation coincides with
Ui) that the developer receives will translate into a loss of their Self-Esteem to
the extent that she does not expend an e ort considered “fair” with respect to
such monetary transfer.
The implications of the choice of an OSS vs. a non-OSS contract are sum-
marized by propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 (non-OSS contract5). The optimal non-OSS contract con-
templates an information rent for the e cient agent only. It implies that there
is no output distortion with respect to the ﬁrst best for the e cient agent and
a downward output distortion with respect to the ﬁrst-best solution for the less
e cient Agent, such that:
S (qL)= L +
v
1   v
   (12)
The output distortion for the ine cient agent derives from the fact that any
increase in the output of the ine cient agent implies an increase in the e -
cient agent’s information rent and a correspondent decrease in the principal’s
expected payo .
Proposition 2 (OSS contract). The optimal OSS contract contemplates an
information rent for the e cient Agent only. It implies that there is no output
distortion with respect to the ﬁrst best for the e cient Agent and a downward
output distortion with respect to the ﬁrst-best solution for the less e cient Agent.
The extent of output distortion decreases as f(eH) increases, according to the
following relationship:
5 La ont and Martimort, 2001
12S (qL)= L +
v
1   v
(1   f(eH)   (13)
The extent of the output distortion for the ine cient agent depends on the
amount of Self-Esteem the e cient agent obtains for a given level of e ort.
This is because, the higher will be f(eH), the lower it will be the cost for the
Principal of providing incentives to the e cient agent through the information
rent, which implies the possibility to increase the output level of the ine cient
agent with respect to the level that would be chosen by the principal in absence
of intrinsic motivation. The choice of an OSS contract, by allowing to “activate”
developers’ intrinsic motivation thus induces a second-best solution to which is
associated a lower extent of output distortion.
Finally, consider the choice between a OSS contract and a non-OSS contract
(such that f(ei) = 0) with an audit mechanism with endogenous punishment.
Let:
sL the probability of discovering the ine cient Agent’s deception;
c(sL) the cost of auditing the ine cient Agent;
PH,P L the amount of the endogenous punishment for the e cient and in-
e cient Agents, other things being equal.
Proposition 3 (non-OSS contract with audit). The solution with endoge-
nous punishment implies that only the ine cient Agent is monitored with a
strictly positive probability, the same production as ﬁrst-best for the e cient
Agent and a reduction with respect to ﬁrst-best production for the ine cient
Agent, that is:
S (qL)= L +
v
1   v
(1   sL)   (14)
Proposition 4 (OSS contract vs. non-OSS contract with audit). The
OSS contract is chosen (rejected) if the necessary cost of activating altruism
13(1   f(eH)) of the more e cient Agent is lower (greater) than the probability
(1 sL) of the loss connected to the non-punishment (exposure) of the less e -
cient Agent in the event of fraudulent behaviour. This is because:
S (qL)= L +
v
1   v
(1   f(eH)     S (qL)= L +
v
1   v
(1   sL)   (15)
if (1   f(eH))   (1   sL)
4 Discussion
The literature has identiﬁed a number of reasons why ﬁrms might ﬁnd in their
interest to contribute to OSS projects. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
tend to participate to OSS communities for reasons that are akin to those of
individual developers (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003). The prominent reason to
contribute seems to be given by the existence of user needs coupled with the
low transaction costs involved by the act of contributing back to the community
software developed for one’s own needs. More generally, OSS o ers to small
ﬁrms the possibility to adopt a business model based on the provision of ser-
vices such as customization and support rather than on the sale of the software.
Corporate players ﬁnd it in their interest contributing to OSS projects out of
four sorts of motivations (FLOSS survey, 2002): (1) standardization; (2) use
of OSS software as a low-cost component; (3) strategic considerations; and (4)
enabling compatibility6.
The model presented in the previous section suggests that ﬁrms might ﬁnd in
their interest to adopt a OSS business model even setting aside market/technical
reasons. It highlights an advantage of the adoption of a OSS business model
that has not been formally analyzed before, namely that the choice of an OSS
6The ﬁrst motivation relates to the fact that a OSS platform o ers a speciﬁc advantage as
a common standard because the license under which it is distributed e ectively prevents any
of the commercial developers adopting the standard from appropriating the software at a later
point of time. The second motivation is easy to understand: the fact that F/OSS software is
free makes it an ideal candidate for being o ered to customers as part of a hardware-software
bundle to meet speciﬁc needs. Contributions to F/OSS software development may also be
motivated by competitive goals, such as the desire to pose a threat to dominant ﬁrms in the
market (3). Finally, ﬁrms might simply be interested in making their software or hardware
compatible with F/OSS software and develop plug-ins necessary to do so (4).
14contract may reduce the cost of providing monetary incentives (in the form of
an information rent) to agents in circumstances in which developers’ behavior
is inﬂuenced by obligation-based intrinsic motivation. These circumstances are
highly likely to occur, according to the empirical literature reviewed in section 2.
Moreover, the model suggests that, if agents attribute a su ciently high weight
to adopting behavior consistent with intrinsic motivation, choosing a form of
production such as OSS that positively inﬂuences intrinsic motivation may be
less costly than adopting a monitoring/punishment arrangement. This is more
likely to hold in contexts such as software development in which agents’ creativ-
ity is involved to a signiﬁcant extent so that monitoring is particularly costly.
One aspect of the formalization that it is important to note is that the cost
of providing monetary incentives is lower when intrinsic motivation is at play,
which implies that the provision of monetary incentives does not crowd out
intrinsic motivation. The formalization of the interplay between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations we propose thus provides theoretical support to the empir-
ical evidence showing that the provision of monetary incentives in the OSS world
does not tend to crowd out intrinsic motivations (Hars et al. 2002; Lakhani et
al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2006). The results of the analysis may be general-
ized beyond the OSS environment. In particular, the analysis suggests that,
whenever intrinsic motivation signiﬁcantly inﬂuences agents’ behavior it might
be rational for a purely self-interested ﬁrm to organise those activities that are
likely to exert a positive inﬂuence on agents’ motivations in a way that is con-
sistent with those motivations.
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